Authentication via electronic personal history questions is a novel technique that aims to enhance questionbased authentication. This paper presents a study that is part of a wider investigation into the feasibility of the technique. The study used academic personal web site data as a source of personal history information, and studied the effect of using an image-based representation of questions about personal history events. It followed a methodology that assessed the impact on both genuine users and attackers, and provides a deeper insight into their behaviour. From an authentication point of view, the study concluded that (a) an imagebased representation of questions is certainly beneficial; (b) a small increase in the number of distracters/options used in closed questions has a positive effect; and (c) despite the closeness of the attackers their ability to answer correctly with high confidence questions about the genuine users' personal history is limited. These results are encouraging for the feasibility of the technique.
INTRODUCTION
Passwords are widely used to authenticate users in a variety of contexts. Their popularity stems from the ease with which they can be implemented and administered. They also have well understood theoretical security properties. However, these mechanisms also suffer from well-reported usability problems (Brostoff, 2004 , Yan et al, 2004 . At the heart of these problems lays the fact that passwords that are difficult for attackers to guess are also difficult for genuine users to remember. In other words, secure passwords are not user-friendly.
In recent years, a number of usable authentication schemes have been proposed that aim to address the usability problems of passwords (DeAngeli et al, 2002 , Dhamija, 2000 , Passface, Pering et al, 2003 , Wiedenbeck et al, 2005 , Zviran and Haga, 1990 . Question-based authentication using personal facts appears as a particularly promising approach. Typically question-based authentication schemes involve an answer registration step, in which users set up one or more questions and their answers, followed by an answer presentation step, in which users are challenged by (some of) their questions and are required to provide the registered answers for successful authentication (Just, 2004) . However, the effectiveness of current questionbased authentication is limited. The number of personal facts used is kept quite small and fairly generic, and the answer registration phase is rarely repeated (Just, 2004) . The main idea of our research is to improve the effectiveness of question-based authentication by replacing answer registration by an automated process that constructs questions and answers from the electronic personal histories of users.
Our approach is motivated by two main observations, first detailed electronic records of users' personal histories are already available, and second the use personal history information in question-based authentication is appealing both from a security and usability point of view. In today's world as users go about their everyday life, they leave behind trails of digital footprints (Harper et al, 2008) . These trails consist of data captured by a plethora of information and communication technologies when users interact with them. For example, trails of shopping transactions are captured by the information systems of credit card companies; while mobile phone networks capture trails of visited areas, etc. The abundance of cheap storage space makes it easy to keep lasting records of these trails (Harper et al, 2008) . As the deployment and use of information and communication technologies becomes pervasive, people's digital footprints come closer to an electronic record of their personal history. At the same time, personal history information grows continuously over time. This allows an increasing set of questions to be generated for authentication purposes. Not only that but the questions can also be personalized. Moreover, authentication can also be dynamic, i.e. a different set of questions and answers can be used at each authentication attempt. All these make it more difficult for an attack to succeed. In addition to this, as electronic personal histories comprise of trails from a variety of sources, it is also more difficult for attackers to compromise the mechanism with a successful attack against an individual data source, or by impersonating the user in a particular context. More importantly, though, these characteristics can be provided with minimal impact on usability, as users are likely to know quite well their personal history and no additional effort is required from their part.
This paper presents a study that was carried out using data from academic personal web sites as a source of personal history information. The study is part of a series of studies that aim to establish the appropriateness of personal history information as a basis for question based authentication. The study explores the extent to which participants could recall events from their personal academic history and successfully answer questions about them. At the same time, it explores to what extent their colleagues are able to answer the same set of questions. In particular, the study investigates the impact of using an image-based formulation of questions in the ability of the participants to correctly answer them. The main conclusions of the study are:
• Image-based formulation of questions has a significant, positive impact on the ability of genuine users to answer correctly the questions and no significant impact on attackers.
• A small increase in the number of distracters in closed questions has a significant negative impact on the ability of attackers to answer them correctly and no significant impact on genuine users.
• Despite the closeness of attackers to genuine users, their ability in answering the genuine users' questions correctly with high confidence is quite limited.
The rest of the paper starts with a review of related work, focusing on previous work on usable authentication mechanisms. This review draws some interesting conclusions that motivates our overall approach and identifies some ideas for exploration. This is followed by an outline of our general research methodology that sets the context for the current study. Then, the study itself is presented in detail including the procedures followed, its results, and the conclusions drawn. The paper concludes with a summary and directions for future research.
RELATED WORK
In recent years, a number of usable authentication schemes have been proposed that aim to address the usability problems of passwords. These schemes can be roughly classified into two categories, those that use questions about personal attributes (facts and opinions), which are easy to recall, and those that use images, which are easy to recognise and recall. The former category includes schemes like questionbased authentication (Just, 2004) and cognitive passwords (Zviran and Haga, 1993) , which uses personal facts and opinions. The latter includes mechanisms like random art (Dhamija, 2000) , Passfaces (Passface), personal images (Pering et al, 2003) , Awas-E (Takada and Koike, 2003) , and VIP (De Angeli et al, 2002) , which differ in the type and origin of images, and the way these are used as described below.
All these schemes involve a registration phase, where the "password" is set up, and an authentication phase where the user is challenged to provide the "password". At registration different approaches require different levels of user involvement. In some schemes the system selects the "password" on users' behalf. In others, users select a password from a list of system provided ones. Some even allow complete freedom to users in choosing their "password". During authentication, some schemes challenge users to provide the complete "password", while others only part of it. Others go further and challenge users with a series of challenges/questions. In some schemes the questions are open, where the user has to provide their "password", while in others closed, where the users have to choose the password from a list of provided ones. In general, it seems that the greater the user involvement in the "password" registration phase, the more memorable and applicable the "password" is, while closed questions remove any repeatability problems. Applicability refers to the extent to which the chosen questions apply to the user population, while repeatability refers to the extent to which the correct answer does not have multiple syntactic representations and its semantic value remains the same over time (Just, 2004) .
However, improving usability is not by itself the end goal, as this improvement may be at the expense of security. It is interesting to note that most usable authentication schemes have been proposed without an analysis of their robustness against attacks. More specifically, a closed question only makes sense from a security point of view, if measures are taken to militate against brute-force attacks, e.g. large number of distracters and multiple independent questions, but the impact of such measures to usability has not been fully assessed. Moreover, questions-based schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to guessability attacks by close friends and family (Zviran and Haga, 1990 ). These problems can be further exacerbated, if the questions used have not been carefully chosen to ensure that the correct answer cannot be uncovered with a small number of attempts, or are publicly available (Just, 2004) , particularly when users provide their own questions. Similarly, for image-based schemes studies have shown that users show statistically significant biases in image selection (Davis, Monrose and Reiter, 2004) . The use of personal images is fraught with even more difficulties and dangers, as care needs to be taken to ensure that images provided are not easily guessable (Pering et al, 2003) , because for example they include the user. In addition to this, image-based schemes due to their nature are also more vulnerable to shoulder surfing and observation attacks.
We believe that a question-based authentication scheme using electronic personal history information has the potential to strike the right balance between security and usability. First, as personal history information grows over time, it should be more and more difficult for others, even close family and friends, to know it fully. The increase in the number of potential questions should also make the scheme more robust to guessability attacks and less vulnerable to shoulder surfing, observation and brute force attacks. Second, by asking questions about events from the user's personal history, the scheme ensures maximum applicability with each user potentially having their own questions. It also has a potentially strong personal link essential for memorability. In order to establish that these properties hold in practice an in depth empirical investigation of personal history information is necessary.
METHODOLOGY
For personal history information to be deemed appropriate for authentication purposes, one needs to establish that users can easily recall events from their personal history and can successfully answer questions about them. One also needs to show that others cannot successfully answer the same questions and cannot easily impersonate users. In this respect, of particular concern are those that share parts of a user's personal history. An added complication is that the trails of digital footprints comprising a user's electronic personal history may take various forms with different characteristics.
For these reasons, our work carries out a number of studies, using different types of electronic personal history data. Each type of data is used to generate a number of questions focusing on particular events of the participants' personal histories. Moreover, each study combines a study of genuine user behaviour, in which participants are asked to answer questions about their personal history, with a study of attacker behaviour, in which participants are asked to answer questions about the personal history of other participants. The focus is in establishing a statistically significant difference in the ability of genuine users and attackers to answer the same set of questions. Furthermore, each study carries out a number of experiments that explore whether certain parameters can improve the results, by either improving genuine users' performance or deteriorating attackers' performance, or both.
In this context, we have already carried out two studies. The first (Nosseir et al, 2005) used electronic personal calendar data that provide a clear set of personal history events. It showed that only questions about events that are recent, repetitive, pleasant, or strongly associated with particular locations produce statistically significant difference in the ability of genuine user and attackers to answer them correctly. However, this study was quite limited, with a small number of participants, as people were very reluctant to share their personal calendar data. The second study used sensor data generated by an instrumented research laboratory (Nosseir et al, 2006) . The study built on the earlier results focusing only on events that are recent and repetitive, and also showed a difference in the ability of genuine users and attackers to answer the questions correctly. An interesting thing about this study was that personal history events had to be inferred from the underlying sensor data. Despite using a fairly basic algorithm, the inference proved very accurate. However, this study was also quite limited with a small number of participants, and the sensor data although plentiful, only allowed person arrival and departure events to be inferred.
For this study, academic personal web site data are used to overcome the above limitations. Academic personal web sites are easily accessible and are usually rich in information about the personal academic history of the person. This makes it straightforward to generate a large variety of personal history events, from teaching, research, study and even leisure activities. In addition to this, within an academic department some of these activities will be shared, so participants will have some shared history providing us with attackers that are close to the participants they attack. Furthermore, most academics nowadays have a personal web site, providing us with a large pool of potential participants.
Despite these advantages, we should make clear that personal web sites, academic or otherwise, are not an appropriate source of information for authentication purposes, because all their information is public and accessible to attackers. That said, academic personal web sites, offer traces of digital footprints similar to systems that are not publicly available. As a result, they can be used to draw conclusions about the appropriateness of personal history information for authentication purposes, provided that during the attack part of the study participants do not have access to the web.
ACADEMIC PERSONAL WEB SITE STUDY

Participants and Procedures
The study was conducted within an academic department and twenty-four members of staff agreed to take part, three women and twenty-one men with an average age of forty-one. For all participants, we analysed the information on their academic personal web site in order to identify a number of events from their history. Building on the results of our earlier studies, we focused our attention on events that are recent, repetitive, pleasant or strongly associated with particular locations. These provided us with a large collection of events about which to build questions. The collection included events associated with teaching, research, studies and leisure activities. For example, teaching events included lectures and tutorials the academic teaches, research events included research group and project meetings, paper publications and conference attendances, study events included degrees awarded, while leisure events included sports event attendances and participation.
The study in accordance to the methodology outlined above consisted of two parts: a genuine users part and an attackers part. Its main goals were first, to see whether there is any difference in the ability of genuine users and attackers to answer correctly questions about the personal history events identified above, and second, to see what the effect is of using an image-based formulation of questions in the ability of genuine users and attackers to answer them correctly. The latter goal was motivated by the related work in the area of usable authentication, where image-based schemes have been shown to offer certain advantages with respect to usability. Our intention was to examine whether similar advantages will materialize in the context of personal history information. With these goals in mind, from the identified events for each participant we constructed four textbased questions and two image-based ones. Unfortunately, for a lot of the questions it was not possible to construct reasonable image-based formulations. The image-based questions were of three types: (a) images of people, (b) images of places, and (c) maps. The images used were all taken from the web. The images of people were co-authors of published papers, research project collaborators or the chairs of attended conferences (see Figure 1) . In all cases, the people were external to the department.
The images of places were pictures of bespoke buildings from university campuses and conference venues, or landmarks in the vicinity of conference venues (see Figure 2) . The maps were university campus maps or conference venue maps (see Figure  3) . All questions generated were closed in order to avoid repeatability problems in providing the answers. The questions were either true/false or four-part multiple choice as in some cases it was not possible to identify an adequate number of reasonable distracters. The large number of true/false and four-part multiple choice for both text and image-based questions, presented us with the opportunity to also explore the effect that the number of options has to the ability of genuine users and attackers to answer the questions.
The study was conducted through a series of interviews, one with each participant. To facilitate the attack part of the study and keep the overall effort required by participants reasonable, they were divided into three groups of eight. The groups were formed alphabetically according to participants' surnames. At the beginning of the interview each participant was presented with a questionnaire, and the aims of the study and procedures followed were explained. The questionnaire consisted of eight parts. In the first part the participant played the role of a genuine user answering her own questions, while in the remaining seven parts she played the role of an attacker answering the questions of the other participants of her group. In each attack, the attacker was made aware who the target of the attack was. In addition to answering the questions each participant was also asked to indicate how confident she was about each answer. For this purpose a five point Likert scale was used, ranging from 'very unconfident' to 'extremely confident'. The aim of the confidence scale was to gain a deeper insight about the behaviour of genuine users and attackers when answering the questions. The investigator conducting the interview also noted the time it took to answer each question. The purpose of this was to see whether text and image-based questions require a different amount of effort to answer them. Finally, one of the participants that initially agreed to participate failed to attend the interview.
Results
At first we focus on text-based questions that provide the baseline data for this study. As we can see in Figure 4 , genuine users answered 74% of textbased questions correctly, while attackers 49%. Comparing the genuine users' answers against the attackers' we found that the difference is statistically significant (Chi-square =19.439, df=1, p<0.001, two-tailed). These results are comparable to our earlier study (Nosseir et al, 2005) with 78% and 47% respectively. We take this as an indication that there is no fundamental difference between the two types of data as a source of personal information. These results, although encouraging for genuine users are a bit disappointing for attackers. However, a closer look reveals that taking into account the mix of true/false and four-part multiple-choice text-based questions, we will expect attackers to answer correctly approximately 40% of the questions. Note that this percentage is derived as a weighted sum of the true/false percentage of 50% and the four-part multiple-choice percentage of 25%. We conjecture that the difference between the expected and the observed percentages are most likely due to the shared history between participants. We come back to this issue later on when we examine the participants' confidence in their answers. Next we look into image-based questions. As we can see in Figure 4 , genuine users answered 93% of image-based questions correctly and attackers 48%. Comparing the genuine users' answers against the attackers' we found that the difference is statistically significant (Chi-square =39.033, df=1, p<0.001, two-tailed). From these results there appears to be an improvement in the genuine users' ability to answer the questions correctly. Statistical tests confirm that this improvement is significant (Chi-square =7.793, df=1, p<0.01, two-tailed). On the other hand, the attackers' ability to answer questions correctly at first appears almost unchanged. However, a closer look reveals that taking into account the mix of true/false and four-part multiple-choice image-based questions, we will expect attackers to answer correctly approximately 34% of the questions. As a result, it may be the case that attackers' performance improved. However, statistical tests show that there is in fact no significant difference. From the above results, we conclude that using an image-based formulation of questions is beneficial for authentication purposes, as it significantly improves genuine users' performance without any significant impact for attackers.
Next we look at the different types of imagebased questions, i.e. images of people, images of places and maps, to see how each type performs. As we can see in Figure 5 , the performance of genuine users is pretty similar across all types of imagebased questions, 92%, 94% and 92% correct answers for images of people, images of places and maps. However, the performance of attackers shows some noticeable variation. Although their performance is pretty similar for images of places and maps with 53% and 54% of correct answers respectively, for images of people it drops to 40%. In fact, it is their performance in images of people that drops their overall performance to 48%. The reasons for this variation in the performance of attackers are not clear. As a result, this issues needs to be investigated further in the future. We now focus on the confidence with which participants answered their questions. In our analysis we considered the top two levels of the Likert scale as high confidence, and the lower three as low confidence. The first observation from Figure 6 is that genuine users answer much more questions correctly with high confidence than attackers. We believe this is because they often really know the correct answer. The second observation is that attackers also appear to give the correct answer with high confidence in 15% of the text-based questions and 14% of the image-based ones. Surprisingly, these percentages are quite low, despite the close academic relationships between the participants. These results also largely explain the quite high overall correct answers given by attackers. They confirm our supposition that a person's personal history is difficult for others, even those close to her, to fully know. The third observation is that there are a number of cases where both genuine users and attackers give wrong answers with high confidence. Based on informal discussions with the participants, we attribute this to confusion with some of the questions. It is interesting to note that there appears to be a lot less confusion with image-based questions than text-based ones. Another interesting point is that when participants have low confidence in their answers, genuine users tend to give correct answers more often than not, 52% and 79% for textbased and image-based questions respectively. However, attackers tend to give more often wrong answers, 61% and 60% for text-based and imagebased questions, respectively. The reasons behind this are not clear and require further investigation in the future. We then turn our attention to the time taken to answer the questions. As we can see in Table 1 , attackers take on average less time than genuine users to answer their questions. However, this difference is not statistically significant. Another interesting observation is that on average both genuine users and attackers take longer to answer image-based questions, however again the difference is not statistically significant. We have also analysed how long participants took to answer each type of image-based question. As we can see in Figure 7 , map questions take on average noticeably longer to answer for both genuine users and attackers. However, this difference is not statistically significant. It is also interesting to note that map questions also have the greatest standard deviation.
The final issue we examine is how the number of options affects the ability of participants to answer questions correctly. As we can see in Table 2 for genuine users there is a drop in the percentage of correct answers for four-part multiple-choice compared to True/False questions for both textbased and image-based formulations. However, statistical tests show that these differences are not significant. The situation is different when we examine the attackers. As we case see in Table 2 in this case there is a noticeable drop in the percentage of correct answer as we move from True/False to four-part multiple-choice questions for both textbased and image-based formulations. Statistical tests confirm that in both cases this difference is significant with (Chi-square =13.909, df=1, p<0.001, two-tailed) for text-based and (Chi-Square =9.500, df=1, P<0.005, two-tailed) for image-based formulation. From these results we conclude that increasing the number of options is beneficial for authentication purposes as it significantly reduces attackers' performance without any significant impact for genuine users. 
Study Conclusions
The first conclusion is that an image-based formulation of questions is certainly beneficial. It provides a significant improvement to genuine user performance. In fact, it brings genuine user performance within the range of being definitely appropriate for authentication purposes with more than 90% correct answers. It also has some impact in reducing user confusion. More importantly, all these advantages are realized without any improvement in attacker performance, i.e. no increase in vulnerability against guessability attacks. The second conclusion is that a small increase in the number of distracters in closed questions is also beneficial. As it would be expected, it makes things more difficult for attackers by reducing their chances of guessing the correct answer. More importantly, though, it does not have any significant impact on genuine user performance. In general, the more distracters we use the worse the performance of attackers should be however it is not clear how far we can go before the genuine user performance begins to suffer. We should point out that a similar effect to attacker performance could also be achieved by increasing the number of questions. Again, it is unclear what the impact of this would be on genuine user performance. More interestingly, it is also unclear how the two approaches, using more distracters and more questions, could be combined to improve overall authentication performance. These are points we intend to explore in the future.
The third conclusion is that the ability of attackers to answer genuine users' questions correctly with high confidence is in general quite low. This is true even though the study was carried out within a single academic department and focused on personal history information from academic personal web sites. This is really encouraging for the appropriateness of personal history information for authentication purposes. However, it would be also interesting to see whether these results will hold, if the attackers are selected based on their closeness to the genuine user instead.
The final conclusion is that despite the positive impact of increasing the number of distracters, and the encouraging results with respect to the ability of attackers to answer correctly with high confidence genuine users' questions, attackers' performance is quite good overall. Identifying techniques that could make attacker performance more acceptable should be the focus in future work. In this respect, the primary aim is to investigate the impact of using multiple questions. Another idea is to use an inference mechanism in the generation of the questions that tests the knowledge acquired by experiencing an event, not just knowledge of the event details. This would make things a lot more difficult for attackers, but of course additional research is needed to find good ways of doing this. Note that we have already used simple forms of inference in our second study where sensor data were used to infer user arrival and departure events, and in generating the image-based formulation of the questions in the current study.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented a study that is part of a wider investigation into the appropriateness of electronic personal history information for authentication purposes. The study used academic personal web site data as a source of personal history information. The main aim of the study was to examine the effect of using an image-based formulation of questions about personal history events. In contrast, to most other work in this area, the study followed a methodology that assesses the impact on both genuine users and attackers (others close to the genuine users). The study concluded that an image-based representation of questions is certainly beneficial from an authentication point of view. It also concluded that a small increase in the number of distracters used in closed questions has a positive effect to authentication performance. In addition to this, the study also showed that despite the closeness of the attackers their ability to answer correctly with high confidence questions about the genuine users' personal history is limited. These conclusions contribute positive results to the wider investigation into the appropriateness of electronic personal history information for authentication purposed.
Besides the points identified above, moving this investigation forward requires that we adopt a wider perspective. So far, our investigation has exclusively focused on the performance of genuine users and attackers in answering correctly the generated questions. As the results in this front are encouraging, it is now time to consider additional aspects that determine the appropriateness of the approach for authentication. The main issue is to determine to what extent and in which contexts such an authentication mechanism would be acceptable to users. User acceptance relies primarily on two aspects. How effective and efficient the mechanism is to use, and whether this use of personal data is acceptable to users. In doing so, we need to study the mechanism in specific contexts, e.g. for authentication to online services, or authentication to users' personal mobile devices, etc.
In conclusion, authentication via electronic personal history questions seems very promising in comparison to other usable authentication schemes.
Our initial studies show some encouraging results for its feasibility; however further research is necessary before a concrete authentication mechanism can be produced.
